Developing and Defeating Adversarial Examples by McDiarmid-Sterling, Ian & Moser, Allan
Developing and Defeating Adversarial Examples
Computer Science and Engineering, Swarthmore College
Ian McDiarmid-Sterling
[imcdiar1@swarthmore.edu]
Professor Allan Moser
[amoser2@swarthmore.edu]
Abstract
Breakthroughs in machine learning have
resulted in state-of-the-art deep neural networks
(DNNs) performing classification tasks in
safety-critical applications. Recent research has
demonstrated that DNNs can be attacked
through adversarial examples, which are small
perturbations to input data that cause the DNN
to misclassify objects. The proliferation of DNNs
raises important safety concerns about
designing systems that are robust to adversarial
examples. In this work we develop adversarial
examples to attack the Yolo V3 object detector
[1] and then study strategies to detect and
neutralize these examples. Python code for this
project is available at
https://github.com/ianmcdiarmidsterling/advers
arial
1.Introduction
This paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we review prior work on adversarial
examples and designing DNNs that are robust to
adversarial examples. In Section 3 we present
our procedure for developing adversarial
examples and in Section 4 we examine strategies
for detecting and neutralizing these examples.
Discussion and conclusions follow in Sections 5
and 6.
There are two broad categories of
adversarial attacks - targeted and untargeted. In a
targeted adversarial attack, the goal of an
attacker is to generate an attack that causes the
system to produce a specific (targeted) incorrect
classification. In an untargeted attack, the goal
of an attacker is to generate any incorrect
classification. Within these two categories
adversarial attacks can be further categorized as
‘general’ or ‘patch based’. In a general attack,
changes are minute, but occur across an entire
image, while in a patch based attack, a small
region of the image is completely obscured by a
patch. Most adversarial examples are not
physically realizable, but research teams have
recently started developing patch based
adversarial examples in the real world.
In this work, we design patch based,
untargeted adversarial examples because they
are physically realizable in the wild.
Attempts have been made to make
DNNs robust to adversarial examples by
explicitly including the examples in the training
data. We point out several weaknesses with these
approaches in the next section, but the most
serious, in our opinion, is that it may make it
more difficult to detect the presence of an attack.
The knowledge that a DNN is under attack is
essential for designing appropriate
mitigation/response strategies. Several strategies
for detecting adversarial examples rely on
‘white-box’ access to the DNN. In this work we
develop ‘black box’ strategies, where the DNN
must be treated as an un-examinable process.
Other research appears promising.
Rouani et al. [5] proposed a method for
identifying adversarial examples by mapping out
the feature space of normal data and adversarial
examples. Their results demonstrate the power
of this strategy, but their method is impossible in
a black box scenario.
In this work we develop what to the best
of our knowledge is a novel strategy for
defending against adversarial examples. An
ideal strategy has the following characteristics:
1. Effective in a black box scenario
2. Low computational time for adversarial
example detection
3. Enables adversarial attack detection and
neutralization
4. Robust to a wide range of adversarial
examples
2.Background and Related Work
The work presented in [2,3,4] has
focused on designing DNNs that are
adversarially robust by explicitly training on
adversarial examples. This approach has two
main weaknesses. Firstly, the range of
adversarial examples for which the DNN is
robust directly depends on the range of training
data. Secondly, as previously mentioned, the
resulting DNN may be more robust to certain
adversarial examples, but is unable to perform
adversarial classification. This prevents attack
recognition, inhibiting knowledge of when an
attack has occurred.
Several researchers have demonstrated
the effectiveness of adversarial examples against
state-of-the-art object detection systems. For
example, Eykholt et al. [6] designed a physically
realizable adversarial patch that fools an object
detection system into misclassifying an image of
a stop sign as a speed limit sign (Figure 1).
Similarly, Thys et al. [7] demonstrated a
physically realizable adversarial patch that is
capable of completely suppressing the detection
of a person in the image provided the patch is
located near the person. Building on this work,
Lee et al. [8] developed an adversarial patch that
completely suppresses detections of multiple
people, and can be located anywhere in the
image.
Figure 1: The adversarial patches placed on a
stop sign from [6] resulting in the complete
misclassification of the stop sign as a speed
limit sign.
Inspired by the work of Lee et al. [8],
we chose to develop adversarial examples for
the Yolo V3 (henceforth Yolo) object detection
model [1].
Yolo is a single shot object detection
system capable of detecting 80 different object
classes. In this work we chose to attack the
‘person’ class, but our approach works generally
for any object class. In the sections that follow
we denote the Yolo class label by ŷ and indicate
the dependence of the probability of observing
this label on the corresponding input image, x, as
ℙ[ŷ | x].
Yolo divides an input image into an n x
m grid of cells and for each cell the detector
returns a list of bounding boxes (B), their
associated confidence scores (C), and class
probabilities (CL). Yolo then uses non-maximum
suppression [9] to suppress extraneous
detections and only return one (B,C,CL) triplet
per object. When C < 0.3 the associated object
bounding box and class label are not returned
and we say that the detector has failed to detect
the object
Figure 2: Original image of the President of Swarthmore College, Dr. Valerie Smith (C=0.9834)(L).
Image with the patch applied (C=0)(R).
3. Patch development
As a measure of effectiveness, we
computed the average Yolo confidence across all
the images in the test dataset. We refer to this
simply as ‘average confidence’ in the
subsequent text.
In development of our adversarial
examples, we created the most versatile patches
possible by designing them to be both location
and scene invariant.
To make the patches less noticeable, we
minimized patch size given the average
confidence was < 0.3. As shown in Table 1 a
100x100 pixel patch was the smallest patch to
meet this criterion. Note that in the absence of
an adversarial example, Yolo detects the person
with an extremely high average confidence over
both the training and test datasets.
Figure 3: Final versions of a trained patch:
100x100 pixels (R) and 50x50 pixels (L).
Patch Size
(Pixels)
Mean
training set
confidence
(32 images)
Mean test set
confidence
(3 images)
No Patch 0.904 0.978
20x20 0.882 0.973
50x50 0.711 0.880
70x70 0.657 0.632
100x100 0.189 0.297
150x150 0.174 0.228
Table 1: Mean confidence of patches trained
for 1000 iterations with fixed hyper-parameters
when applied to datasets.
As discussed in [8,10,11] we
implemented a variation of an expectation over
transformation (EOT) operator. In our EOT
operator, we randomized the location of the
adversarial patch on the image to ensure patch
performance was location invariant.
Similar to the notation in [10] let:
Figure 4: Original image of the author in front of the giant Swarthmore adirondack lawn chair
(C=0.993)(L). Image with the patch applied (C=0)(R).
● x ∈ (0,255)M x N denote the original 8-bit
image
● z ∈ Rn x n denote a trainable patch
● 𝝉 from Rn x n → RM x N denote a family of
allowable affine  transformations
● m𝝉∈ {0,1}M x N denote a binary mask
where 𝝉∈ [1,M] x [1,N]
● i,j denote integer row and column
indices in the original image
We defined the patch application function:
at(x,z) = x +m𝝉☉z
where☉represents the ‘pixel wise’ Hadamard
product. We will denote this combination of the
patch and original image as ‘perturbed image’
We generate our adversarial patch by
solving the following unconstrained
minimization problem:
ẑ = argminz’∈Rn(Et~T[(ℙ[ŷ=’person’|at(x,z’)])2])
We implemented the translation
operation by creating a binary mask mi,j with
ones for rows in the range (i:i+n) and columns
in the range (j:j+n).Such a mask is easily
constructed from the outer product of two binary
vectors with blocks of ones in the appropriate
components.
To solve the minimization problem
above, we used the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) first introduced by Goodfellow et al.
[3]. Given patch z at time t-1 we compute z at
time t using :
zt = zt-1 + ε*sign(∇zt-1J(θ, zt-1, y)) .
where ε is the magnitude of the perturbation
(learning rate). We clip pixel values in the patch
so that 0 <= zt <= 255.
We observed that when a patch was
placed along the edges of an image, the average
confidence of the perturbed image was 0.801
higher than when the patch was placed in the
interior regions of an image. We believe that this
is a result of the image segmentation performed
by Yolo. Specifically, if the patch does not
intersect any of the image segments that contain
an object (in this case a person), the patch will
be unable to impact the detection of the object.
Figure 5: Heatmap of mean Yolo confidence for the original image of the author (Figure 4),
with each point representing the center of the 100x100 patch. The dashed green box represents the
object (person) bounding box and the dashed red box represents possible patch locations with offset
<=25. The white border region is the area in which patches cannot be placed without exceeding the
image dimensions.
To increase the chance that the patch
would intersect one of the segments containing
the person, we constrained the random patch
locations by an offset, so that the edge of the
patch was separated from the object by <= 25
pixels (Figure 5). Within this constraint, at the
vast majority of patch locations C= 0 (Figure 5).
During patch training, we implemented
a momentum calculation. The Gradient of z at
time t can be expressed in terms of the gradient
at the previous time step as:
∇zt = ɑ∇zt + (1-ɑ) ∇zt-1
Where alpha∈ [0,1]
Hyper-parameter optimization was used
to select suitable values for initial learning rate
and number of random transformations. To do
this, we swept the range of acceptable
hyper-parameters, training patches with every
possible combination of parameters and
comparing average confidence values. This
revealed that the average confidence was
independent of the initial learning rate for
learning rates∈ [0.5,20], when controlled for
computational effort. Also, for fixed learning
rates, confidence decreased as the number of
random transformations increased, over the
range from 5 to 1000.
To ensure that the patch was more
effective than a patch chosen by chance, we
compared the trained patch to a patch of
equivalent size with randomly generated pixel
values. This ‘noise patch’ decreased average
confidence by  < 0.010 (Table 2) compared to
the actual trained patch which decreased average
confidence by 0.692 .
Type of
Image
Mean
training set
confidence
(32 images)
Mean test set
confidence
(3 images)
Original
image
0.904 0.978
Image +
‘Noise
Patch’
0.901 0.989
Perturbed
image
0.189 0.297
Table 2: Mean Yolo confidence for original
images, images + ‘noise patches’, and
perturbed images.
4. Neutralizing the adversarial example
Once we generated an adversarial
example, we evaluated its robustness with
respect to two simple perturbations: additive
Gaussian noise, with mean 𝜇 and standard
deviation , and a Gaussian blur.𝜎
To properly assess the range of Gaussian
noise, we studied individual perturbations with 𝜇
∈ [0,50] and 𝜎 ∈ [1,100] . For 𝜇 in the range,
while 𝜎 = c, the average confidence of a
perturbed image decreased by < 0.052. For  𝜎 in
the range, while 𝜇 = c, the average confidence of
a perturbed image decreased by < 0.066. These
results suggest that adding Gaussian random
noise is an ineffective method for defeating
adversarial examples (Table 3).
Type of image Mean
training set
confidence
(32 images)
Mean test set
confidence
(3 images)
Unmodified 0.904 0.978
Image +
noise
0.895 0.973
Perturbed
image
0.189 0.297
Perturbed
image +
noise
0.187 0.153
Table 3: Mean Yolo confidence for original
images and perturbed images with and without
additive Gaussian noise (𝜇 =0, 𝜎 =10)
Figure 6: Images of Dr. Smith: original(C=0.98)(L), perturbed(C=0)(M), perturbed with 3x3 Gaussian
blur applied (C=0.97)(R).
Figure 7: Images of the author: original(C=0.99)(L), perturbed (C=0.0)(M), perturbed with 3x3
Gaussian blur applied (C=0.99)(R).
Based on these observations, we
hypothesized that the specific spatial structure in
the patch is the key to suppressing detections. To
test this theory, we applied a Gaussain blur [12]
with a 3x3 convolution kernel in an attempt to
disrupt this spatial structure (Figures 6 and 7).
This was effective as 3x3 Gaussian blur
increased the average confidence of a perturbed
image by 0.628, while only decreasing the
average confidence of unmodified image by <
0.010 (Table 4).
Type of image Mean
training set
confidence
(32 images)
Mean test set
confidence
(3 images)
Unmodified 0.904 0.978
Image + blur 0.904 0.969
Perturbed
image
0.189 0.297
Perturbed
image + blur
0.817 0.937
Table 4: Mean Yolo confidence for original
and perturbed images with and without
Gaussian 3x3 blur.
5. Discussion
The next phase of this research will
consider the effects of incorporating blur and
other ‘trivial’ countermeasures into the EOT
operator, to explore the potential for generating
patches that are robust to simple
countermeasures like blur, lighting changes, and
perspective shifts. In addition the next stage of
this work will include generating more diverse
patches that can suppress multiple detections in
an image. Finally, we will explore adding a term
to the loss function to incentivise similar values
in adjacent pixels (a printability term),
encouraging examples that are easier to realize
physically.
One way to use simple filtering
operations like Gaussian blur to detect
adversarial examples is to use the difference in
confidence between the original and blurred
image as a predictor of the presence of an
adversarial example.
6. Conclusion
In this work we developed an effective
adversarial example for the Yolo object detector
and then explored two simple strategies for
defending against such examples.
First we created adversarial examples in
the form of location invariant patches that when
applied to images containing a person, decreased
the average confidence of the Yolo object
detector by 0.681, relative to the confidence on
the unmodified images.
Then we explored two simple strategies
to defeat the adversarial examples: applying
additive Gaussian noise or a Gaussian blur
operator. These strategies do not require access
to or knowledge of the Yolo architecture, and
can be performed relatively quickly (compared
to computing a forward pass with Yolo). Of the
two operators, the Gaussian blur operator
allowed detection and neutralization of the
adversarial examples, whereas we found
additive Gaussian noise to be ineffective. When
we augmented a perturbed image with 3x3
Gaussian blur, average confidence increased by
0.640, relative to the confidence in a perturbed
image without Gaussian blur. We show
examples of specific images where 3x3 Gaussain
blur restores an accurate prediction with
confidence > 0.9. In future work we plan to
study the versatility of additional filtering
strategies for detecting and neutralizing
adversarial examples.
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